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Abstract: 
This paper investigates the link between cannabis depenalisation and crime using 
individual-level panel data for England and Wales from 2003 to 2006. We exploit the 
declassification of cannabis in the UK in 2004 as a natural experiment. Specifically, 
we use the fact that the declassification changed expected punishments differently in 
various age groups due to thresholds in British criminal law and employ a difference-
in-differences type design using data from the longitudinal version of the Offending, 
Crime and Justice Survey. Our findings suggest essentially no increases in either 
cannabis consumption, consumption of other drugs, crime and other forms of risky 
behaviour.  
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Introduction 
The effects of cannabis use on a range of outcomes and whether access to it should be 
regulated have been discussed heavily in both the public and in academia (see, e.g., 
Pudney, 2010, for a recent survey). Evidence from various countries indicates that 
cannabis consumption (a) may lead to physical and mental health problems, although 
effects are often not large (van Ours and Williams, 2011; 2012); (b) has mixed effects 
on wages (Kaestner, 1991; Gill and Michaels, 1992; Register and Williams, 1992; 
Kaestner, 1994; van Ours, 2007); (c) has negative, but often weak effects on (un-
)employment (e.g., Gill and Michaels, 1992; Register and Williams, 1992; Kaestner, 
1994; Burgess and Propper, 1998; Zarkin et  al., 1998; MacDonald and Pudney, 2000; 
French et al., 2001; De Simone, 2002; van Ours, 2006) and (d) is correlated with the 
use of other, harder drugs, although it is not clear to what extent cannabis causes the 
consumption of these drugs as predicted by the gateway theory (e.g., van Ours, 2003; 
Pudney, 2003; Melberg et al., 2010). 
In this paper, we evaluate a depenalisation of cannabis possession and consumption in 
the UK in 2004. Using individual-level panel data we consider the effects of this 
depenalisation on crime, consumption of cannabis and other drugs as well as other 
forms of risky behaviour. A link between cannabis consumption and the consumption 
of other drugs has long been suspected (the so-called gateway theory), even though 
causality has been hard to establish (e.g., van Ours, 2003; Pudney, 2003; Melberg et 
al., 2010). Furthermore, a link between cannabis consumption and crime can be 
hypothesized for a range of reasons: (a) consumption of cannabis might have a direct 
impact on individuals’ criminal behaviour (e.g., Adda, McConnel and Rasul, 2011), 
(b) there might be an increase in property crime if individuals commit crimes to 
obtain money for buying drugs (e.g., Adda, McConnel and Rasul, 2011), (c) there 
might be an increase in violent crimes if drug users are also more likely to sell drugs 
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and engage in turf-wars with other dealers (e.g., Adda, McConnel and Rasul, 2011), 
(d) buying drugs might bring drug users into contact with criminals, such as dealers, 
which might influence criminal behaviour through peer effects (e.g., Pudney, 2003) 
and finally (e) depenalisation of cannabis might lead rebellious adolescents turn 
towards other forms of risky behaviour such as low level crime.  
Evidence on the relationship between cannabis, crime and other forms of risky 
behaviour – despite its prominence in society’s opinion and the minds of countless 
worried parents – is relatively sparse. For Britain, Pudney (2003) finds some evidence 
that early cannabis use can increase minor offending and less clear evidence for a link 
with serious crime. Adda, McConnel and Rasul (2011) look at the effects of a 
localized depenalisation of cannabis, leading to an increase in cannabis possession 
offences and – through a shift in police resources towards non-drug crime – to lower 
crime rates. Further evidence has linked the uptake of cannabis use to subsequent 
criminal behaviour in New Zealand (Fergusson and Horwood, 1997), while there also 
exists evidence on the link between the size of drug markets and crime rates (Grogger 
and Willis, 2000; Pacula and Kilmer, 2003). 
The evidence on the link between legalisation or decriminalisation of cannabis and 
cannabis consumption has recently been summarised by Bretteville-Jensen (2006), 
MacCoun (2010), Pacula (2010) and Pudney (2010). The available evidence can be 
broadly grouped into estimates of the reaction of cannabis consumption to changes in 
the monetary price of the drug and into estimates looking into non-price effects of 
legalisation (see Pacula, 2010, for an overview). For the initiation of cannabis 
consumption (e.g., Pacula et al, 2001; Pacula, Chriqui and King, 2003; DeSimone and 
Farrelly, 2003; Jacobson, 2005; van Ours and Williams, 2007; Bretteville-Jensen and 
Williams, 2011) as well as consumption changes of regular users (e.g., Nisbet and 
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Vakil, 1972; Williams et al., 2004, Clements and Zhao, 2009) the evidence generally 
indicates that the number of cannabis users reacts to price changes. Participation 
elasticities in the first case suggest that the number of first time users would increase 
by around 0% to 7% following a 10% drop in the price of cannabis, while the number 
of regular users would increase by between 2.4% to 15%. The evidence on 
decriminalisation (Johnston, et al., 1981; Chaloupka, Grossman and Tauras, 1999; 
Chaloupka et al., 1999; DiNardo and Lemieux, 2001; Pacula et al, 2003), changes in 
enforcement risk (Farrelly et al., 2001; DeSimone and Farrelly, 2003; Pacula et al., 
2003) and changes to penalties and fines (Chaloupka, Grossman and Tauras, 1999; 
Farrelly et al., 2001; Pacula et al., 2003; Markowitz and Tauras, 2009) is very mixed 
for first time and youth users, but generally indicates that more lenient policing 
practices and decreases in penalties and fines will increase the number of cannabis 
users. For regular users, the evidence on enforcement (Pacula,1998; Farrelly et al., 
1999) suggest that more lenient enforcement would increase regular use, while the 
evidence is more mixed and often suggests small or no effects from decriminalisation 
(Thies and Register, 1993; Pacula, 1998; Saffer and Chaloupka, 1999) or changes to 
penalties (Farrelly et al., 1999; Williams et al., 2004).  
Further – more recent - evidence indicates that Marijuana legalisation may decrease 
traffic accidents through a reduction in alcohol consumption (Anderson, Hansen and 
Rees, 2013a) but does not seem to be linked to increased Marijuana consumption 
among teens (Anderson, Hansen and Rees, 2013b). 
In contrast to most of the previous literature on the link between cannabis 
consumption and crime, we exploit a natural experiment – the declassification of 
cannabis from a class B to a class C drug in the UK in 2004 – that led to a large 
reduction in the potential punishment for cannabis possession. The downgrading 
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moved the maximum penalty for possession from 5 to 2 years of imprisonment and 
also lowered fines. This depenalisation obviously affects every person residing in the 
UK, however, the existence of age-related discontinuities in British criminal law 
means that the reductions in expected punishment differ for individuals in different 
age brackets: Individuals below 15 years of age can only be sentenced to custodial 
sentences in a very limited set of circumstances (Power of Criminal Courts 
(Sentencing) Act 2000, section 100), while for individuals between 15 and below 18 
years of age eventual custodial sentences would be detention and training orders 
served in a youth offender institution or a secure training centre instead of 
imprisonment. Individuals above 18 are generally tried according to adult law, but 
individuals between 18 and below 21 years of age would generally be detained in a 
young offenders institution (Power of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, 
sections 96 to 98), which are similar to adult prisons but tend to have somewhat better 
conditions than regular jails and a stronger focus on education and training. These 
age-related discontinuities imply that, say, an 18-year old thinking about taking 
cannabis experiences a larger reduction in expected punishment through the 2004-
declassification than a 15-year old who experiences a larger reduction than a 14-year 
old as the latter could not have been sentenced to a custodial sentence anyway. This 
setup leads to an evaluation design that is quite similar to the one used in evaluations 
of the Federal minimum wage in the US (e.g., Card, 1992), where everyone is treated 
after a certain point in time, but the “bite” of the treatment is different between 
affected units. Evidence on criminal behaviour around these thresholds, in particular 
at the age of criminal majority, suggest that individuals are generally aware of them, 
even though they might miscalculate the actual change in expected punishment 
(Hjalmarsson, 2009), and change criminal behaviour accordingly (Levitt, 1998; 
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Hjalmarsson, 2009; Lee and McCrary, 2009; Braakmann, 2013). There is also a large 
and well-established literature in the economics of crime that suggests that individuals 
in general react to changes in expected punishments (see Freeman, 1999, and Klick 
and Tabarrok, 2012, for surveys). 
Our estimation strategy exploits these differences in the changes in expected 
punishment in a difference-in-differences-type evaluation design where we compare 
changes in the consumption of cannabis and other drugs and changes in criminal and 
other risky behaviour pre and post declassification between individuals aged 10 to 14, 
15 to 17, 18 to 21 and above 21. This design implies that we essentially look at 
changes in penalties and changes to police practices to the extent that the latter vary 
according to age as changes to prices and (general) police practice are more likely to 
affect every individual in our sample in a similar way. Our findings imply no 
consistent pattern of changes in either cannabis consumption or other risky behaviour. 
These results are broadly consistent with the existing literature on the effects of 
decriminalization or changes to penalties. 
 
Empirical strategy 
Background: The declassification of cannabis and changes in expected punishment 
for possession 
The possession and distribution of cannabis in the UK is generally illegal. For most of 
the time cannabis was classified as a class B drug, placing it in the middle category of 
the classification system created by the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971. Class A covers the 
most dangerous drugs such as heroin, cocaine or crack, while class C encompasses 
drugs such as sleeping pills, ketamine or anabolic steroids. Other class B drugs are 
amphetamine or codeine. 
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Penalties for possession and distribution differ across drug classifications. The 
maximum prison sentences for possession are 7 years for class A, 5 years for class B 
and 2 years for class C. Furthermore, being caught in possession of a class C drug will 
generally only lead to a formal warning or caution (unless there is a history of drug 
offences or the intent to distribute), while possession of a class A or B drug is more 
likely to lead to prosecution (see, e.g., the advice by the British government at 
https://www.gov.uk/penalties-drug-possession-dealing or the advice by DrugScope at 
http://www.drugscope.org.uk/resources/faqs/faqpages/what-are-the-uk-drug-laws). 
Maximum sentences for distribution are generally much higher and may involve life 
sentences for class A and imprisonment up to 14 years for both class B and class C 
drugs. 
Following a lengthy discussion about the classification of cannabis (see, e.g., Police 
Foundation, 1999), then-Home Secretary David Blunkett announced the intention to 
declassify cannabis to a class C drug in 2001, which became effective in January 
2004. Cannabis was reclassified as a class B drug in January 2009. However, due to a 
lack of data this later reclassification plays no role in this paper. The declassification 
effectively makes possession of cannabis less risky as both the likelihood of a 
prosecution (as opposed to a warning or caution) and the maximum penalties are 
lowered. 
To fix thoughts consider a standard Becker model of illegal behaviour (Becker, 1968; 
Freeman, 1999) applied to cannabis consumption. Individuals weight the expected 
utility of not consuming cannabis (the legal alternative, U
NC
) with the utility of taking 
cannabis (U
C
) while taking into account the risk of being caught by the police 
(occurring with probability p) and the disutility of punishment (U[S]), where S 
denotes the severity of punishment. An individual will take cannabis if 
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U
NC 
< (1-p)*U
C
 – p*U[S],        (1) 
i.e., if the utility of taking cannabis (taking into account the risk of punishment) 
exceed the utility of not taking cannabis. Depenalisation can affect consumption 
through two channels: (a) The detection probability p can change if police priorities 
change and (b) the severity of punishment will change. 
Evidence from sentencing statistics is only available for a few years, but to give an 
impression about expected punishments: In 2006 – when cannabis was a class C drug 
– there were 113,322 recorded offences of cannabis possession. Of these, 80,500 
(71%) ended with a formal warning, 20,370 (18%) with a caution, 6368 (5.6%) with a 
fine, 2527 (2.2%) with a community sentence, 141 (0.1%) with immediate custody, 
66 (0.06%) with a suspended sentence, 3069 (2.7%) with a discharge and 281 (0.2%) 
with other sentences. In contrast, for Amphetamines (a class B drug), there were 4058 
offences, of which 1899 (46.8%) ended with a caution, 940 (23.9%) with a fine, 429 
(10.6%) with a community sentence, 85 (2.1%) with custody, 38 (0.9%) with a 
suspended sentence, 601 (14.8%) with a discharge and 66 (1.6%) with another 
sentence (all statistics from Department of Health, 2008, p. 200). In other words, 
punishments for the possession of a class B drug appear to be much more severe than 
for class C drugs.  
Further evidence on changes to penalties associated with cannabis use is available in 
Bryan, Del Bono and Pudney (2013), who present descriptive evidence from the 
Criminal Justice Statistics. This evidence suggests that convictions and cautions for 
cannabis possession drop after 2003, while the number of cannabis warnings and on-
the-spot-fines increase (p.22). Furthermore, the number of people sentenced to 
immediate custody decreases over time and reaches a low during the years 2004 to 
2007, while the number of people sentenced to custody for production increases 
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steadily over the same time period (p. 24). Finally, their evidence (p. 25) suggest that 
the vast majority of custodial sentences for cannabis possession are very short, i.e., 
below 1.5 months, which suggests that the main effect of the declassification will be 
around the type of sentence and not the length of an eventual custodial sentence. 
(FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE.) 
It is also possible that the declassification changes police practice. For example, if the 
police do not agree with the lower penalties, they could potentially try to increase 
arrest probabilities to reach the same level of deterrence as before the declassification. 
Figure 1 investigates this possibility by plotting the probability of an arrest for drug 
possession for cannabis users and non-cannabis users using the Offending, Crime and 
Justice Survey for the years 2003 to 2006. The evidence clearly suggests an decrease 
in the likelihood to be arrested for drug possession for cannabis users of all age 
groups for the years 2004 and 2005 and for all age groups except for 18 to <21 year 
olds also for 2006. Overall figure 1 suggests that the police became more lenient and 
did not try increasing arrests to counter the lower penalties with the possible 
exception of the age group 18 to <21, where arrests returned to pre-declassification 
levels in 2006. 
As outlined in the introduction, the declassification affects principally every 
individual living in the UK. However, the changes in the expected severity of 
punishment differ in two dimensions between individuals of different age. The first 
dimension is the risk of being convicted to a custodial sentence, the second is the 
unpleasantness associated with this custodial sentence that will differ according to the 
institution where the custodial sentence needs to be served (Katz et al., 2003, use a 
similar idea, i.e., that the conditions encountered during imprisonment can lead to 
variation in expected punishment and thus deterrence.): 
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 For individuals below 15 years of age expected punishments change only 
slightly if at all. These individuals cannot not be sentenced to a custodial 
sentence, so the only difference for them would be a change in a potential fine 
 For individuals above 15, the declassification lowers the risk of receiving a 
custodial sentence. The fact that the type of institution offenders are sent to in 
case of a conviction changes at 18 and 21 creates further variation within this 
group. 
Data 
This paper uses the four-year panel version of the Offending, Crime and Justice 
Survey (OCJS) for the years 2003 to 2006. The data were collected by BMRB Social 
Research and the National Centre for Social Research (NatCen) on behalf of the 
Home Office with the aim to provide a longitudinal picture of the prevalence of 
offending and drug use among the general population, in particular among young 
people. Fieldwork took place between January and July in 2003, between January to 
September in 2004 and between January and Ocotber in 2005 and 2006. The sample 
covers individuals living in England and Wales who were between 10 and 25 years of 
age at the time of the first wave in 2003. In each wave individual from the previous 
waves were re-interviewed. In addition, refreshment samples were drawn in each year 
the survey was conducted. The version of the OCJS used here is the longitudinal 
version provided by the Home Office via the Economic and Social Data Service. As 
this paper uses secondary data analysis from publicly available data sources, 
additional ethical approval was not required. The data cover all individuals who were 
interviewed in each of the four waves the survey was conducted, in total 2539 
individuals and 10,156 person-year observations. As there is a potential concern with 
selective attrition, we also estimated all regressions using the four cross-sectional 
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datasets of the Offending, Crime and Justice Survey as well as an unbalanced panel. 
The results were qualitatively identical.  
Cannabis consumption is measured by a dummy variable that is “1” if the individual 
reports to have consumed any cannabis in the previous year. As outcomes we 
consider the consumption of a range of drugs, in particular, heroin, cocaine, crack, 
amphetamines, ecstasy, acid, amyl nitrites and glue, as well as a summary measure for 
the consumption of any class A drug. These are all measured by dummy variables that 
are “1” if an individual took the respective drug at least once per year. In terms of 
crime, we look at a range of dummy variables that are “1” if an individual reports to 
have committed a certain type of crime in the respective year. We look at general 
crime as well as violent and property crime and also consider various subcategories. 
Finally, we also have data on a range of low-level criminal activities that can be 
classified as anti-social behaviour, as well as information on victimization. All of 
these variables are self-reported, which might lead to measurement error problems 
discussed in the next subsection. However, the crime and drug use data was collected 
using computer assisted self-completion to minimise individuals over- or understating 
their criminal behaviour. 
Table 1 present descriptive statistics for the whole estimation sample. 
(TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE.)  
Estimation 
Our basic estimation strategy is a difference-in-differences type of design where we 
exploit different intensities in treatment among individuals aged 10 to 14, 15 to 17, 18 
to 20 and 21 and older. Our base group are 10 to 14 years, i.e., the group where the 
declassification led to the lowest change in punishment. Our basic estimating equation 
is 
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,    (2) 
where is the respective measure of cannabis consumption of individual i observed 
in year t.  is an individual-level fixed effect that captures time-constant variables 
such as family background.  are year dummies. We also control for the individual’s 
age through a set of dummies for each year of age. The coefficient of interest is 
which measures changes in cannabis consumption between individuals in age group k 
relative to individuals aged 10 to 14 (marked by ) after the declassification 
(marked by ). Note that the effects of  are not identified, as group 
membership is based on age and thus perfectly collinear with the age dummies. 
Similarly the base effect of  is not identified due to the year dummies. The 
effect of their interaction, however, is identified from the data. Note that individuals 
can change the treatment group they are in if they cross one of the age thresholds. 
This, however, is what we want as their expected punishment and hence their 
incentives to consume cannabis would change at the same time. 
Note that this design implies that we identify  using the differential impact the 
declassification had on the four age groups. Changes to general police practices or the 
price of cannabis after the declassification cannot be detected with this design. As 
such our estimates are closer to studies looking into changes to penalties and police 
enforcement than to studies incorporating price effects. 
A concern with the presence of the individual fixed effects is a possible exacerbation 
of measurement error resulting in attenuation bias towards zero. This problem would 
be more severe if there was comparatively little variation in cannabis consumption (or 
other variables of interest) within individuals over years. Table 2 plots year-to-year-
Yit =ai +ft +b ´ f (ageit )+ t
k
k=1
3
å *(treatkit ´ postit )+eit
Yit
ai
ft
t k
treat kit
postit treat
k
it
postit
t k
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changes in the consumption of cannabis. As we can see there is always a sizeable 
number of cases starting or stopping to consume cannabis between each pair of years. 
Pooled over all years, 3% of the under 15-year-olds, 22% of the 15 to 17-year-olds, 
29% of the 18 to 20-year-olds and 21% of the over-21-year-olds consumed cannabis. 
We also looked at the percentage of variation in cannabis consumption that is 
explained by the fixed effects, year dummies and age alone. For both annual and 
monthly consumption these factors explain approximately 50% of the total variation, 
i.e., there is sufficient variation left that could be influenced by the policy. 
(TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE.) 
As an additional robustness check we also re-estimate equation (2) as a pooled OLS 
model without fixed effects. The fixed effects in principle control for potential 
composition bias in the various treatment groups, however, as the treatment groups 
are defined by a exogenous variable (age) crossing a threshold we would expect the 
impact of composition bias to be relatively minor anyway. 
Note that  is usually a dummy, which means that equation (2) is a linear 
probability model. This fact, however, is not particularly problematic in this case as 
equation (2) is close to a saturated regression models as all right-hand side variables 
in our preferred specification are dummy variables. This fact attenuates concerns 
regarding the linearity assumption typically leading to differences between linear 
probability models and non-linear models such as Probit (see Angrist and Pischke, 
2009, ch. 5.2.1). 
It is important to stress that the fact that the declassification was not surprising but 
was announced and widely discussed prior to 2004 is not a threat to identification in 
equation (2): The idea underlying our approach is that individuals will react to the 
change in punishment which came into effect in 2004, not to the earlier 
Yit
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announcement that punishment will change in 2004. This idea seems relatively 
plausible as long as individuals are deterred from consumption by the higher 
punishment under the old regime. A potential violation could arise because of 
misinformation or the belief that courts would treat consumers more leniently in 
advance of the declassification. However, this possibility seems relatively far fetched. 
Furthermore, the fact that there are strong age effects in most outcomes (see Figure 2 
for cannabis consumption – other outcomes also show strong age effects) is not 
problematic due to inclusion of the age dummies. A potential threat to identification 
would be other events that would operate along the same age group margin as the 
cannabis declassification, in particular other changes to criminal law that would lead 
to similar changes in expected punishment. Fortunately, there were no such changes 
during the observation period. 
(FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE.) 
Due to the lack of a long time series pre-treatment it is difficult to test the validity of 
the common trend assumption across the four groups from the micro data used here. 
Figure 3 presents evidence on trends from an annual report by the British Home 
Office (Home Office, 2012). Unfortunately, the data does not contain any information 
for individuals below 16 and the age groups are slightly different from the ones used 
in this paper. Keeping these problems in mind, the aggregate data at least does not 
show vastly different trends among the different age groups, which is reassuring. 
(FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE.) 
Finally, we employ a basic placebo test where we estimate equation (2) with various 
outcomes that should be largely uninfluenced by the declassification. Specifically, we 
look at (grouped) household income, marital status, labour force status, whether the 
individual is/was brought up by both parents, whether he is currently a tenant, 
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whether there is disorder in the area of residence, whether he considers crime to be 
okay, whether he trusts local people and whether he has a negative attitude towards 
the local area. Obviously, some of these variables could be influenced by cannabis 
consumption; however, it seems plausible that the declassification should have very 
weak and indirect, if any, effects on them. Results can be found in table 3. If these 
resulted in statistically significant impacts of the declassification, we would have 
strong indications that unobservables are driving the differences between the four 
groups. Luckily, the results do not indicate any such pattern, even though some of the 
estimates are imprecise enough to allow for substantial differences to go undetected. 
While there are significant effects on one or two variables, these are well within the 
range of false positives one would expect and there is no consistent pattern that would 
indicate any problems. 
(TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE.)  
 
Results 
Consider first figure 4, which plots the change in the proportion of individual who 
report to have taken cannabis at least once a year pre and post declassification. The 
figure suggests that – while changes in consumption vary considerably with age – 
there is no clear pattern across age groups more or less affected by the 
declassification.  
(FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE.) 
The estimates in table 4 confirm these results.
 
Overall there are very few statistically 
significant and economically large effects: There appears to be a 4.6% increase in the 
likelihood to consume cannabis after 2004 in the 15 to 17-age group, but only if one 
looks at the fixed effects estimates. At the same time, however, we observe (non-
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significant) decreases in the likelihood of cannabis consumption in the two older age 
groups and no statistically significant impact on the likelihood of regular (monthly) 
cannabis consumption, except for one age group in the pooled OLS results where a 
statistically significant decrease is seen. For other drugs, there are generally almost no 
changes in consumption patterns – including for the age group where an increase in 
cannabis consumption could be observed. However, some of the estimates are not 
very precise and could in principle allow for fairly large increases in consumption to 
go undetected. Overall, these results do not appear to lend much support to the idea 
that cannabis depenalisation increases consumption of cannabis or might even induce 
people to consume other drugs, even though it is possible that it led to a higher 
number of first-time users among 15 to 17-year olds. The previous literature on 
cannabis deregulation is very heterogeneous in terms of findings, but it appears as if 
our results suggest at most a relatively modest effect of the declassification. 
(TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE.)  
Consider now the results on crime in table 5. Given that there does not appear to have 
been an increase in drug consumption, some of the theoretical arguments for a link 
between cannabis depenalisation mentioned in the introduction can be ruled out a 
priori except for the 15 to 17-age group. Specifically, explanations such as people 
committing property crimes to obtain money for buying drugs or any direct 
behavioural consequence of drug consumption would require an increase in drug 
consumption as a starting point. It would, however, still be possible to observe an 
increase in crime if teenagers or young adult gain consumption value from illicit 
behaviour, cannabis loses part of its appeal due to the depenalisation and people 
substitute cannabis consumption with other forms of illicit or risky behaviour. 
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The evidence in table 5 suggests no increases in crime for any of the older groups 
where we also did not observe an increase in consumption. However, some of the 
point estimates are fairly large and are just rendered insignificant by large standard 
errors. For the 15 to 17-age group, where we also observed an increase in cannabis 
consumption, the fixed effects estimates suggest an increase in the likelihood of 
having committed a property offence by 5% to 7%, depending on whether minor theft 
is included. There are no increases in violent crime in any of the groups following the 
declassification. Interestingly, however, there appears to be an increase in the 
production of drugs for individuals older than 21. In principle, this could be a 
consequence of the declassification, either because of an increase in demand or 
because individuals misinterpret the fact that production penalties have not changed. 
(TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE.)  
We also considered more disaggregated crime categories,. Detailed results are 
available on request, but broadly spoken, the estimates suggest that the increases in 
property crime observed for the 15 to 17 year-olds are driven by increases in criminal 
damage and other theft, i.e., relatively low-level crimes relative to other property 
crime such as robbery and burglary. Impacts on other types of crime are usually small 
and often insignificant. Overall, the results do not strongly suggest that the cannabis 
declassification led to an increase in crime rates: Most of the results are small and 
insignificant, and, more importantly, there is no consistent picture over treatment 
groups or estimation methods and the few significant effects that are found might be 
very well due to chance.  
We also considered a possible effect on risky behaviour in general as well as going 
out and drinking. For the latter Anderson, Hansen and Rees (2013a) found some 
evidence that alcohol and cannabis are substitutes in the US. Detailed results are again 
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available on request, but the esatimates suggest that risky behaviour, such as graffiti 
spraying, being unruly and noisy, the carrying of weapons and victimization, did not 
increase after the declassification. If anything, the estimates suggest substantial 
reductions in racially motivated attacks and victimization risks among 15 to 17 year-
olds, while there are essentially no impacts in any of the other groups. For going out 
and drinking, our results suggest no consistent pattern of changes to either clubbing, 
visiting pubs or drinking. If anything, moderate drinking seems to have increased in 
some age groups, while heavy drunkenness remained essentially unchanged.  
The overall picture that emerges from these estimates suggests that following the 
declassification there do not appear to have been any increases in cannabis 
consumption in the groups that should have benefitted more from the declassification. 
There appears to have been a slight increase in occasional (but not regular) cannabis 
consumption among 15 to 17 year-olds, although this result might very well be due to 
chance. In the same group there has also been an increase in property crimes, driven 
by relatively low-level offences such as criminal damage and other theft. There does 
not appear to have been an increase in violent crime, drug crime or more serious 
property crime in any of the groups. Among 15 to 17 year-olds there also appears to 
have been a drop in victimization risks. Some of these results, however, depend on 
whether individual fixed effects are included. Overall, the estimates certainly do not 
suggest that individuals react very strongly to reductions in penalties associated with 
cannabis consumption, neither in terms of drug consumption nor in terms of other 
forms of criminal or risky behaviour. It is important, however, to be clear that our 
estimates cannot detect consumption changes caused by changes to the price of 
cannabis. The previous literature has regularly found strong demand reactions to these 
and prices might well have changed in response to the declassification. Our paper is 
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closer to the part of the literature looking at changes to penalties, police enforcement 
or decriminalisation more generally. Our findings are also broadly in line with this 
literature in the sense of not finding very much evidence that decriminalisation of 
cannabis leads to large increases in consumption. 
Conclusion 
We exploited differences in the expected punishment for cannabis consumption 
through the 2004 cannabis declassification in the UK across various age groups. Our 
results from difference-indifferences estimates do not suggest strong increases in 
cannabis consumption or indeed crime, risky behaviour or drug consumption more 
generally in the age groups that benefitted more from the declassification. There is 
some evidence that cannabis consumption and some forms of property crime 
increased among 15 to 17 year-olds. At the same time, however, racially motivated 
attacks and victimization risks dropped. Overall, the estimates certainly do not 
suggest that individuals react very strongly to reductions in penalties associated with 
cannabis consumption, neither in terms of drug consumption nor in terms of other 
forms of criminal or risky behaviour.  
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics  
Variable Mean Std.dev. Min. Max. 
Aged 15 to 17 0.258 0.438 0 1 
Aged 18 to 20 0.162 0.368 0 1 
Aged above 21 0.257 0.437 0 1 
Age 17.4 4.5 10 29 
Household income £20k to £30k 0.154 0.361 0 1 
Household income £30k or higher 0.300 0.458 0 1 
Unemployed 0.024 0.152 0 1 
Inactive 0.070 0.255 0 1 
Married 0.042 0.200 0 1 
Cohabiting 0.075 0.263 0 1 
Not brought up by both parents 0.323 0.468 0 1 
Tenant 0.286 0.452 0 1 
Disorder problems in local area 0.677 0.468 0 1 
Considers crime to be okay 0.089 0.285 0 1 
Trusts local people 0.310 0.462 0 1 
Has negative attitude towards local area 0.205 0.404 0 1 
Any offence last year 0.225 0.418 0 1 
Any offence, minus minor offences 0.211 0.408 0 1 
Any serious offence last year 0.107 0.310 0 1 
Any property offence last year 0.125 0.330 0 1 
Any property offence, minus minor heft 0.115 0.319 0 1 
Any violent offence last year 0.145 0.352 0 1 
Any violent offence, minus school fights 0.134 0.340 0 1 
Any vehicle theft 0.013 0.115 0 1 
Any drug offence  0.029 0.168 0 1 
Taken cannabis at least once per year 0.167 0.373 0 1 
Taken cannabis monthly 0.081 0.273 0 1 
Age taken up cannabis (only cannabis users) 17.8 3.5 10 29 
Taken amphetamine at least once per year 0.022 0.145 0 1 
Taken cocaine at least once per year 0.038 0.191 0 1 
Taken crack at least once per year 0.003 0.050 0 1 
Taken ecstasy at least once per year 0.030 0.171 0 1 
Taken heroin at least once per year 0.001 0.035 0 1 
Taken acid at least once per year 0.015 0.123 0 1 
Taken amyl-nitrite at least once per year 0.027 0.163 0 1 
Taken glue at least once per year 0.008 0.091 0 1 
Taken any class A drug at least once per year 0.055 0.227 0 1 
Individuals 2521 
Person-year-observations 9521 
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Table 2: Year-to-year changes in cannabis consumption 
 2003 to 2004 2004 to 2005  2005 to 2006 
Does not 
consume in t, 
consumes in 
t+1 
139 179 146 
Consumes in t, 
does not 
consume in t+1 
88 123 147 
Consumes in 
both years 
204 268 297 
Does not 
consume in 
both years 
1705 1844 1860 
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Table 3: Placebo test, impact of declassification on various outcomes that it should not have influenced 
 HH 
income 
£20k to 
£30k 
HH 
income 
greater 
than £30k 
Unemployed Inactive Married Cohabiting Not 
brought up 
by both 
parents 
Tenant Disorder 
in local 
area 
Considers 
crime to be 
okay 
Trusts 
local 
people 
Has negative 
attitude 
towards 
local area 
 Pooled OLS 
Post 2004 * 
15 to 17 
-0.007 0.015 0.011** 0.002 0.004*** 0.005* 0.005 0.020 0.023 -0.009 0.004 0.006 
 (0.023) (0.029) (0.005) (0.007) (0.001) (0.003) (0.032) (0.030) (0.032) (0.018) (0.019) (0.024) 
Post 2004 * 
18 to 20 
-0.034 0.011 -0.010 -0.036* -0.001 -0.023 -0.042 -
0.071** 
0.037 -0.036* -0.026 -0.049 
 (0.027) (0.033) (0.015) (0.020) (0.006) (0.018) (0.034) (0.034) (0.036) (0.021) (0.032) (0.032) 
Post 2004 * 
above 21 
-0.000 -0.029 -0.003 -
0.044** 
-0.022 0.001 -0.034 -0.019 0.036 -0.008 0.061*** -0.036 
 (0.024) (0.030) (0.010) (0.017) (0.015) (0.020) (0.026) (0.028) (0.030) (0.015) (0.023) (0.026) 
 Fixed effects 
Post 2004 * 
15 to 17 
0.009 -0.011 0.006 0.003 -0.003** 0.005 0.004 0.014 -0.008 -0.007 -0.010 -0.006 
 (0.030) (0.036) (0.010) (0.011) (0.001) (0.008) (0.017) (0.013) (0.033) (0.022) (0.027) (0.027) 
Post 2004 * 
18 to 20 
0.020 -0.006 -0.029 0.016 0.016* 0.019 -0.006 -0.037 -0.003 -0.031 -0.072* -0.020 
 (0.035) (0.043) (0.021) (0.021) (0.009) (0.021) (0.013) (0.024) (0.042) (0.027) (0.037) (0.034) 
Post 2004 * 
above 21 
0.052 -0.008 -0.008 -0.006 0.023* 0.001 -0.009 -0.016 -0.045 -0.010 0.058** -0.065** 
 (0.034) (0.042) (0.014) (0.017) (0.014) (0.024) (0.013) (0.021) (0.038) (0.021) (0.029) (0.030) 
Person-year-
obs. 
9521 9521 9521 9521 9521 9521 9521 9521 9521 9521 9521 9521 
Individuals 2521 2521 2521 2521 2521 2521 2521 2521 2521 2521 2521 2521 
P-value 
OLS vs FE
a 
0.1309 0.6079 0.5353 0.0057 0.0000 0.2540 0.4780 0.7468 0.0887 0.9932 0.4834 0.4805 
Coefficients, standard errors adjusted for clustering on the individual level in parentheses. */**/*** denote statistical significance on the 10%, 
5% and 1% level respectively. All estimates contain year dummies and the individual’s age in dummies. 
a
 Test of equality of the coefficients in the OLS and FE estimates 
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Table 4: Cannabis declassification and drug consumption (at least once per year unless otherwise stated) 
 Cannabis Cannabis monthly Amphetamine Cocaine Crack Ecstasy Heroin Acid Amyl-Nitrite Glue Any class A drug 
 Pooled OLS 
Post 2004 * 15 to 17 0.005 -0.003 0.005 0.004 -0.003 -0.000 -0.003 0.000 -0.020** -0.006 0.006 
 (0.021) (0.015) (0.006) (0.007) (0.003) (0.008) (0.002) (0.006) (0.010) (0.006) (0.009) 
Post 2004 * 18 to 20 -0.018 -0.048** 0.020* -0.002 -0.004 0.009 -0.000 0.003 0.003 -0.008 -0.010 
 (0.030) (0.024) (0.012) (0.016) (0.004) (0.015) (0.001) (0.011) (0.014) (0.007) (0.020) 
Post 2004 * above 21 -0.031 -0.021 0.002 0.009 -0.001 0.011 0.001 0.001 0.008 -0.004 0.012 
 (0.020) (0.015) (0.009) (0.013) (0.004) (0.011) (0.003) (0.007) (0.009) (0.004) (0.013) 
 Fixed effects 
Post 2004 * 15 to 17 0.046** 0.008 0.008 0.016 -0.006* 0.014 -0.003 0.003 -0.003 0.007 0.014 
 (0.023) (0.017) (0.009) (0.011) (0.003) (0.011) (0.002) (0.008) (0.013) (0.007) (0.013) 
Post 2004 * 18 to 20 -0.026 -0.038 0.043** -0.003 -0.001 0.021 0.004 0.020 -0.025 -0.005 0.012 
 (0.031) (0.025) (0.018) (0.018) (0.005) (0.020) (0.004) (0.016) (0.018) (0.011) (0.022) 
Post 2004 * above 21 -0.016 -0.007 0.003 -0.008 0.002 0.018 -0.002 0.007 0.013 -0.006 0.008 
 (0.023) (0.017) (0.013) (0.015) (0.004) (0.013) (0.002) (0.009) (0.012) (0.006) (0.015) 
Person-year-obs. 9521 9521 9521 9521 9521 9521 9521 9521 9521 9521 9521 
Individuals 2521 2521 2521 2521 2521 2521 2521 2521 2521 2521 2521 
P-value OLS vs FE
a
 0.3745 0.7697 0.4870 0.4370 0.1275 0.4463 0.4282 0.5044 0.1372 0.1871 0.7227 
Coefficients, standard errors adjusted for clustering on the individual level in parentheses. */**/*** denote statistical significance on the 10%, 
5% and 1% level respectively. All estimates contain year dummies and the individual’s age in dummies. 
a
 Test of equality of the coefficients in the OLS and FE estimates 
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Table 5: Cannabis declassification and crime (at least once per year 
 Any 
offence 
Any offence, except 
minor offences 
Any serious 
offence 
Any property 
offence 
Any property offence, 
except minor theft 
Any violent 
offence 
Any violent offence, 
except school fights 
Drug offence 
(production & 
distribution) 
 Pooled OLS  
Post 2004 * 15 
to 17 
-0.029 -0.016 -0.014 -0.014 -0.013 -0.038 -0.018 -0.000 
 (0.030) (0.028) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.026) (0.025) (0.010) 
Post 2004 * 18 
to 20 
-0.001 0.003 -0.013 -0.015 -0.005 -0.007 0.002 -0.013 
 (0.033) (0.032) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.028) (0.027) (0.015) 
Post 2004 * 
above 21 
0.004 0.009 -0.012 -0.025 -0.025 0.006 0.014 0.019*** 
 (0.025) (0.023) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.020) (0.019) (0.007) 
 Fixed effects  
Post 2004 * 15 
to 17 
0.053 0.059* 0.024 0.067** 0.058** 0.020 0.042 0.008 
 (0.033) (0.032) (0.026) (0.028) (0.028) (0.030) (0.029) (0.013) 
Post 2004 * 18 
to 20 
0.050 0.049 -0.000 0.040 0.041 0.014 0.026 0.007 
 (0.040) (0.039) (0.030) (0.032) (0.031) (0.034) (0.033) (0.019) 
Post 2004 * 
above 21 
0.022 0.031 -0.034 -0.021 -0.009 0.000 0.011 0.021* 
 (0.031) (0.030) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.026) (0.025) (0.011) 
Person-year-
obs. 
9521 9521 9521 9521 9521 9521 9521 9521 
Individuals 2521 2521 2521 2521 2521 2521 2521 2521 
P-value OLS vs 
FE
a
 
0.0293 0.0620 0.0596 0.0018 0.0154 0.0532 0.0386 0.6616 
Coefficients, standard errors adjusted for clustering on the individual level in parentheses. */**/*** denote statistical significance on the 10%, 
5% and 1% level respectively. All estimates contain year dummies and the individual’s age in dummies. 
a
 Test of equality of the coefficients in the OLS and FE estimates 
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Figure 1: Probability to be arrested for a drug possession offence by age group 
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Figure 2: Cannabis consumption by age 
 
Note. The dashed lines indicate the four different age groups used in the analysis. 
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Figure 3: Trends in cannabis consumption by age group, 1996 to 2011. 
 
Source: Home Office (2012), Table D.03. 
Note: The dashed line indicates the timing of the declassification in 2004. 
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Figure 4: Changes in cannabis consumption by age pre-/post declassification 
 
Note. The dashed lines indicate the four different age groups used in the analysis. 
